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First steps towards into the unknown. The possibilities 
prospects of unconventional gas extraction in Ukraine
Mykhailo Gonchar
Ukraine’s deposits of unconventional gas (shale gas, tight gas trapped in non-porous sand-
stone formations, and coal bed methane) may form a significant part of Europe’s gas reserves. 
Initial exploration and test drilling will be carried out in two major deposits: Yuzivska (Kharkiv 
and Donetsk Oblasts) and Oleska (Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblasts), to confirm the volume of 
the reserves. Shell and Chevron, respectively, won the tenders for the development of these 
fields in mid 2012. Gas extraction on an industrial scale is expected to commence in late 2018/
early 2019 at the earliest. According to estimates presented in the draft Energy Strategy of 
Ukraine 2030, annual gas production levels may range between 30 billion m3 and 47 billion m3 
towards the end of the next decade. According to optimistic forecasts from IHS CERA, total 
gas production (from both conventional and unconventional reserves) could reach as much as 
73 billion m3. However, this will require multi-billion dollar investments, a significant improve-
ment in the investment climate, and political stability. It is clear at the present initial stage 
of the unconventional gas extraction project that the private interests of the Ukrainian gov-
ernment elite have played a positive role in initiating unconventional gas extraction projects. 
Ukraine has had to wait nearly four decades for this opportunity to regain its status of a ma-
jor gas producer. Gas from unconventional sources may lead not only to Ukraine becoming 
self-sufficient in terms of energy supplies, but may also result in it beginning to export gas. 
Furthermore, shale gas deposits in Poland and Ukraine, including on the Black Sea shelf (both 
traditional natural gas and gas hydrates) form a specific ‘European methane belt’, which could 
bring about a cardinal change in the geopolitics and geo-economics of Eastern and Central 
Europe over the next thirty years. 
Nevertheless, the Ukrainian unconventional 
gas extraction project will need to face a num-
ber of challenges. The insufficient transparen-
cy of government measures when signing the 
production separation agreements (PSA) with 
Western companies has served to spur on op-
ponents of shale gas extraction. As shale gas 
extraction projects continue to develop, we 
should expect to see ever more frequent at-
tempts by Russia to block them. Moscow wants 
Ukraine to remain dependent on Russian gas 
supplies, and thus it will inspire and support 
the opponents of shale gas extraction. If Gaz-
prom takes control of the Ukrainian transit gas 
pipelines, this may become one of the instru-
ments with which Russia will be able to tor-
pedo unconventional gas extraction projects. 
If a Ukrainian-Russian gas consortium for gas 
pipeline management is formed or the pipe-
lines are leased to Gazprom, this may prevent 
larger supplies of Ukrainian gas from entering 
the market. 
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Initial estimates of the unconventional 
gas reserves 
Ukraine’s unconventional gas deposits are lo-
cated in the two energy resource basins: the 
Dnieper-Donets Basin (DDB) in the east of the 
country and the Lviv-Volhynia Basin (LVB) in 
the west. Shale gas is found both in the east 
and west of Ukraine, while tight gas trapped in 
non-porous sandstone formations and coal bed 
methane are to be found mainly in the east. 
According to initial estimates provided in the 
still unapproved Energy Strategy of Ukraine 
2030, gas from non-porous sandstone forma-
tions is the most promising form of unconven-
tional gas. Estimated reserves of tight gas range 
between 2 and 8 trillion m3 and are found at 
depths of between 4 and 5 km. Estimated shale 
gas reserves range between 5 and 8 trillion m3. 
In turn, the volume of potential coal bed meth-
ane deposits is expected to range between 
12 and 25 trillion m3. These are located pre-
dominantly in the DDB, although some are also 
to be found in the LVB. A serious problem is 
posed by the fact that coal deposits in Ukraine 
lie rather deep, at between 0.5 km and 5 km, 
and are quite thin (0.5–2 m). As a result, pro-
duction requires considerable financial outlays. 
The ‘shale revolution’ in the USA has also given 
rise to increasing interest in other forms of un-
conventional hydrocarbons, especially methane 
hydrates from the Black Sea. Ukraine’s govern-
ment approved a programme called ‘Gas Hy-
drates of the Black Sea’ as far back as in 1993. 
This programme envisaged a broad range of 
geological and exploration work and the devel-
opment of production technology1. Interest in 
the once forgotten methane hydrates has re-
turned of late. This is an effect of both joint 
1 Seismic surveys have been carried out and several re-
search expeditions have been organised. However, the 
economic crisis in the 1990s and the government’s in-
ability to conduct long-term programmes have slowed 
down further work. See the report by the presidential 
National Institute for Strategic Studies of July 2012: 
Стан і перспективи освоєння видобутку газогідратів 
в українському секторі Чорного моря; http://od.niss.
gov.ua/articles/492/
Ukrainian-German research in the Black Sea 
basin, which was conducted in 2010–2011, and 
the first successful attempt to extract natural 
gas from offshore deposits in Japan, which was 
completed on 12 March 2013. 
First projects
In May 2012, Ukraine resolved its two first ten-
ders for exploration and test drilling in the Yuz-
ivska field in the DDB (Shell) and the Oleska field 
in the LVB (Chevron). Yuzivska is a promising 
field, with an area of 7,886 km2, located in the 
Kharkiv and Donetsk Oblasts, with deposits of 
tight gas in non-porous sandstone formations. 
Its estimated gas reserves2 are 4.05 trillion m3. 
This field will be exploited by Shell Exploration 
and Production Investments B.V., which signed 
a production separation agreement with the 
government of Ukraine in January 2013 (see 
Appendix 1). 
In addition to the Yuzivska field, Shell is also the 
operator as at the six licensed sites nearby (their 
total area is 1,300 km2) under the joint-venture 
agreement it signed in 2006 (and updated in 
2011) with Ukraine’s largest gas producer, the 
state-owned corporation UkrGazVydobuvan-
nya3. The agreement allowed Shell to make 
the first test drill on 25 October 2012 at the 
‘Bilyaivska 400’ site without the need to wait 
until the production separation agreement con-
2 Уряд затвердив розробників Юзівської та Олеської 
газових площ; http://www.kreschatic.kiev.ua/ua/4084/
art/1337021639.html
3 ”Укргазвидобування” і Shell Exploration and Produc-




If Gazprom takes control of the Ukraini-
an transit gas pipelines, this may become 
one of the instruments with which Russia 
will be able for Russia to torpedo uncon-
ventional gas extraction projects.
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cerning the Yuzivska field is signed. A series of 
drills are to be made as part of a five-year initial 
exploration plan for areas rich in gas and oil. 
Given the fact that first untraditional gas test 
drills in Poland took place in October 20094, the 
corresponding process in Ukraine started three 
years later.
The second gas field offered under tender, 
Oleska, extends over an area of 6,324 km2 
in the Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblasts. Accord-
ing to initial data5, its forecasted shale gas re-
serves are 2.98 trillion m3. This field is to be ex-
ploited by Chevron (no production separation 
agreement has been signed as yet). The project 
conditions are the same as in the case of the 
Yuzivska field. 
The winners of the tenders which have already 
been resolved have been obliged to guarantee 
investments at the search and exploration phase 
worth at least US$200 million in the Yuzivska 
field and US$162.5 million in the Oleska field. 
The tender provides that “the maximum part 
of the compensation production from which 
the investor will receive compensation for the 
costs incurred shall be 70% of the total produc-
tion volume until the investor’s costs have been 
compensated completely.” The state’s share in 
the profitable part of the production will be 




5 Уряд затвердив розробників Юзівської та Олеської 
газових площ; http://www.kreschatic.kiev.ua/ua/4084/
art/1337021639.html
6 http: //zakon4.rada.gov.ua/ laws/show/1298-2011-
%D0%BF 
7 h t t p : / / z a ko n 4 . r a d a .g o v.u a / l a w s / s h o w / 1297-
2011-%D0%BF
Shell and Chevron were granted a 50% share 
each in their respective fields. The remaining 
50% in each case was acquired by Ukrainian 
companies: Nadra Yuzivska and Nadra Oleska. 
These were established by the state-owned 
company Nadra Ukrayny (90% of the shares) 
and a small private firm named SPK-GeoSer-
vice (10%), which offers geological services (see 
Appendix 2). Each of the investor corporations 
(Shell and Nadra Yuzivska) received a 50% share 
in the rights and obligations. The licences for 
operation at both fields will be valid for 50 
years. Production is expected to start on an in-
dustrial scale around 2018–2019, provided that 
reserves which allow for the commercial pro-
duction of gas are confirmed. 
If investors decide to launch industrial produc-
tion, investment expenses should be at least 
US$3.125 billion in the case of the Oleska field 
and US$3.75 billion in the case of the Yuzivs-
ka field8. It is difficult to assess now to what 
extent these investment expenses will be suf-
ficient. The Ministry of Energy and Coal Indus-
try of Ukraine commissioned a report from IHS 
CERA ‘Natural Gas and Ukraine’s Energy Future’ 
in 2012. According to this report, industrial pro-
duction of unconventional gas and the achieve-
ment of annual production levels at 25 billion m3 
(in aggregate: shale gas, gas from non-porous 
sandstone formations and coal bed methane) is 
possible, on condition that investments in the 
fields reach US$2–3.5 billion, and in some peri-
ods even US$10 billion9. However, this did not 
refer only the two fields mentioned above; they 
also took into account the launch of gas pro-
duction in other areas of Ukraine. Tender docu-
mentation is currently being prepared for two 
more fields in eastern Ukraine. A positive trend 
has also been observed as regards potential 
investments in unconventional gas extraction. 
Austria’s RAG, Italy’s Sorgenia and Ukraine’s 
8 Mykhailo Gonchar, Unconventional Gas Resources 
in Ukraine, Review for UGOS, 2012. 
9 http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_
id=245244792&cat_id=244277212
Production is expected to start on an in-
dustrial scale around 2018–2019, provid-
ed that reserves which allow for the com-
mercial production of gas are confirmed.
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Geological Office ‘Lviv’ are interested in shale 
gas deposits in the western part of the country. 
Italy’s ENI has purchased 50.01% of the shares 
in Zakhidhazinvest (a joint venture of Nad-
ra Ukrayny and Britain’s Cadogan Petroleum), 
which holds nine licences on sites in the LVB, 
with a total area of 3,800 km2, and is planning 
to launch shale gas exploration10.
The emergence of the anti-fracking 
movement…
Soon after the tender results were announced 
officially in May 2012, protests against uncon-
ventional gas extraction started. Initially, these 
were ecological protests, criticising the use of 
the hydraulic fracturing method since this al-
legedly poses the threat of a ‘second Cherno-
byl’ for Ukraine. In fact, the hydraulic fracturing 
method has been in use since 1947. In Soviet 
times, it was also applied in Ukrainian fields. 
The first fracturing of a coal deposit took place 
in 1954 in Donbas. In the 1990s, actions were 
taken every year to boost production at Ukrain-
ian oil and gas drills, and hydraulic fracturing 
of the deposits was among the methods used. 
Anti-fracking sentiments have intensified 
since the Donetsk and Kharkiv Oblast coun-
cils approved (respectively on 16 January and 
17 January 2013) the draft production separa-
tion agreement for the Yuzivska field. The me-
dia, the opposition and independent experts 
have accused by the Ukrainian government and 
Shell of non-transparent dealings and of con-
cealing the alleged negative ecological conse-
quences of the project’s implementation from 
the public. In the opinion of some of the city 
councillors, the decisions were “suspiciously 
hastily pushed through by the majority from 
the Party of Regions.” Actions taken by the 
government and the corporations, in fact, were 
not free of errors, especially given the fact that 
10 Італійська Eni видобуватиме сланцевий газ в Україні; 
http://ipress.ua/news/italiyska_eni_vydobuvatyme_
slantsevyy_gaz_v_ukraini_3062.html
the text of the production separation agree-
ment was published on the Internet by one 
of the city councillors several days after it was 
signed. The communists immediately capital-
ised on the atmosphere of public distrust to-
wards shale gas extraction projects. They an-
nounced their intention to initiate and hold 
a referendum concerning a ban on unconven-
tional gas extraction. The government chose 
not to hold an information campaign in the me-
dia and also to not collaborate with local coun-
cillors; this was taken advantage of by shale gas 
opponents. Professional associations, for ex-
ample, the Association of Ukrainian Geologists, 
the Kyiv International Energy Club (Q-Club) and 
the Association of Drilling Industry Workers 
(a well-known and respected, independent and 
unbiased organisation) are trying to serve as 
platforms for dialogue. 
… and its political aspects
The anti-fracking campaign was instantly 
turned into a political issue, and unconvention-
al gas became an element of political struggle. 
UDAR is the only parliamentary opposition par-
ty which still supports shale gas extraction in 
Ukraine11. Batkivshchyna is almost ready to join 
the informal alliance of the ‘fracking-phobes’ 
despite the fact that most Batkivshchyna mem-
11 In an interview for the Interfax Agency, Klitchko said: 
“We hope that the contracts which have been signed 
can guarantee that Ukraine satisfies a huge part of its 
needs in the future. Then many issues, including political 
ones, will no longer be valid, and our opponents, who 
are treating gas as a political and not an economic issue, 
will lose their trumps.” http://ua.interfax.com.ua/news/
political/140586.html#.US2T7DC-2So
The anti-fracking campaign instantly was 
instantly turned into a political issue, and 
unconventional gas became an element of 
political struggle.
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bers representing the interests of industrial cir-
cles have a positive attitude towards unconven-
tional gas extraction. Svoboda has become the 
fiercest opponent of fracking. This party con-
trols the Ternopil and Lviv Oblast councils, and 
therefore is capable of blocking the approval 
needed for the draft production separation 
agreement with Chevron concerning the Oles-
ka field. Chevron, fearing an increase in tension 
and a possible confrontation inside the LVB, 
has rejected the central government’s proposal 
to enter into the agreement without obtaining 
consent from local authorities. Instead, Chev-
ron is continuing its information campaign at 
the regional level. This is the right move, but it 
was made too late. 
Another typical example of an anti-fracking 
protest is the stance taken by a grouping of 
marginal significance called ‘Ukrainian choice’, 
which is led by Viktor Medvedchuk, who was 
the head of the presidential administration un-
der Leonid Kuchma12. In his opinion, hydraulic 
fracturing technology “is causing catastroph-
ic ecological consequences: the water and air 
are poisoned, the landscape is destroyed, even 
earthquakes are possible, and the number 
of cancer cases is increasing …”13. 
Errors made by the government have led to fa-
vourable conditions being created for the rapid 
development of an informal political anti-frack-
12 Viktor Medvedchuk is seen in Ukraine as a person who 
has connections in the families of Russia’s leaders (Presi-
dent Vladimir Putin and the wife of the former president 
and current prime minister of Russia, Svetlana Medvede-
va, are the godparents of Medvedchuk’s daughter).
13 О. Анцибор, М. Гончар, Видобуток нетрадиційного 
газу у Франції: еволюція підходів, Чорноморська без-
пека №4 (26) 2012, с.70; http://blogs.korrespondent.
net/celebrities/blog/viktorvmedvedchuk/a82631
ing movement, which is formed by ecological 
organisations, activists from Svoboda, support-
ers of Medvedchuk and the communists. This 
is an ideologically eclectic movement, but all 
its members share a common goal – to pre-
vent unconventional gas extraction in Ukraine. 
Its actions are not coordinated at present part-
ly due to political and ideological differences 
and partly due to personal animosity between 
its participants. However, a clear behind-the-
scenes active external influence can be seen 
and this may transform this artificial alliance 
into a mechanism being steered from outside 
Ukraine. It seems that a financial instrument 
aimed at lasting and regular anti-fracking ac-
tivity in Ukraine has already been created. 
According to unconfirmed reports, its financial 
foundation is a ten-year contract which envis-
ages sale of 4 billion m3 of Russian gas annually 
in Europe. This contract is being implemented 
by a completely unknown company which rep-
resents the interests of those who are lobby-
ing against the unconventional gas extraction 
project and of one of the former managers of 
Naftohaz, who lives abroad. This firm allocates 
up to 25% of its income to support promotion-
al and political activity, and primarily for an-
ti-fracking propaganda. 
An opportunity for a gas Klondike?
Few people know that Ukraine produced over 
60 billion m3 of natural gas annually in the 
1970s14 (a record-high level of 68.11 billion m3 
was achieved in 1975), which accounted for ap-
proximately 25% of total gas production in the 
Soviet Union at that time. Before Siberian gas 
reached Europe, gas from Ukrainian fields had 
been supplied to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hun-
gary and Bulgaria. Four decades later, Ukraine 
has the opportunity to regain its status as a sig-
nificant gas producer, with all the evident ben-
efits and covert challenges this entails. 
14 Нафта і газ України, Під редакцією М.Ковалка, В-во 
«Наукова думка», Київ, 1997, p. 176.
Anti-fracking movement is an ideologi-
cally eclectic, but all its members share 
a common goal – to prevent unconven-
tional gas extraction in Ukraine.
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The draft Energy Strategy of Ukraine 2030 fore-
casts that the production level of natural gas 
will range from 30 billion m3 (the pessimistic 
scenario) to 47 billion m3 (the optimistic scenar-
io) in 2030. This will include shale gas extraction 
of 6–11 billion m3 annually, tight gas extraction 
from non-porous sandstone formations at 7–9 
billion m3 and coal bed methane at 1–3 billion m3, 
while traditional gas production will be at 15– 
–24 billion m3. According to the forecast pro-
vided by IHS CERA15, gas production after 2030 
may exceed 73 billion m3 annually, mainly 
owing to gas extraction from unconventional 
sources and from the Black Sea shelf. Thus it is 
clear that both forecasts pin the highest hopes 
on unconventional gas, the deposits of which 
are located in traditional energy resource pro-
duction areas. 
The cost-efficiency of production and invest-
ment protection are important conditions for 
the success of the unconventional gas produc-
tion project. In the case of Ukraine, initial cost 
estimates range between: US$190 and US$275 
per 1,000 m3 in the case of extraction of gas 
trapped in non-porous sandstone formations; 
between US$263 and US$350 for shale gas ex-
traction; and between US$287 and US$412 for 
coal bed methane. Although at this moment 
the costs of sandstone and shale gas extraction 
suggest that the market price of such gas will 
be competitive, it is difficult to predict what the 
situation will be like at the end of the decade, 
when the indicators calculated using the the-
oretical model will be verified by real produc-
tion. The analysis of the possibilities of uncon-
ventional gas production in Ukraine gives rise 
to the question as to whether the government 
will be able to create the conditions necessary 
for the influx of multi-billion investments. Con-
sidering the experience of the past few years, 
15 See the latest version of the draft Energy Strategy of 
Ukraine 2030 of 11 June 2012; http://mpe.kmu.gov.ua/
fuel/control/uk/doccatalog/list?currDir=50358
it is difficult to give a positive answer to this 
question16.
Gas geopolitics
Unconventional gas reserves in Ukraine and the 
Black Sea shelf (both traditional gas and gas hy-
drates) form a specific ‘methane belt of Europe’, 
which has the potential to bring a fundamental 
change into the geopolitics and geo-economics 
of the Central Eastern European region within 
the next two decades. Although this potential 
is in the realm of theory at the present moment, 
the reaction it causes (in the form of increasing-
ly evident resistance from Russia) is quite real 
and palpable. It is not a coincidence that over 
the past few months Moscow has been putting 
stronger pressure on Ukraine and has inten-
sified its efforts to establish a common man-
agement of the Ukrainian gas pipeline system 
(or to ensure that it is leased to Gazprom), with-
out the EU being involved. If this scenario is re-
alised, control over gas pipelines will also mean 
control of the gas they carry and Gazprom be-
ing able to block supplies from its competitors, 
including also Ukrainian gas from unconven-
tional sources in the future. 
16 The Commissioner for Energy, Gunther Oettinger, stat-
ed that the “production separation agreement signed 
with Shell is a positive example. Now it is important 
that Ukraine guarantees conditions for the investors to 
be able to act according to their plans.” See article by 
Gunther Oettinger: Від Енергетичного співтовариства 




The cost-efficiency of production and in-
vestment protection are important condi-
tions for the success of the unconventional 
gas production project.
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The Ukrainian government has a dilemma – 
should it relinquish control of the gas pipeline 
network in exchange for cheap gas from Rus-
sia and thus put the future of unconventional 
gas production in Ukraine at stake, or should it 
give up its attempts to strike a deal with Rus-
sia (which may turn out to be short-lived) and 
thus gain prospects for the development of 
this strategic branch of the economy? Beyond 
any doubt, the Ukrainian government would 
like to have both (cheaper Russian gas and the 
development of the Ukrainian unconventional 
gas project). This is, however, impossible, and 
a choice will have to be made in the immediate 
future. This choice will be of a geopolitical qual-
ity. A decision in favour of unconventional gas 
will ‘push’ Ukraine towards Europe. However, it 
is vital that the EU becomes aware beforehand 
of the significance of this ‘methane belt’ for the 
sake of its own energy security and that of the 
competitiveness of its economy. It must also be 
aware that, by offering Ukraine a membership 
perspective, it gradually forces the regime to 
carry out reforms.
Europe’s gas vanguard 
It is definitely too early at present to state 
that unconventional gas extraction projects in 
Ukraine are a success. This is also true about 
Poland and other places in Europe. Shale gas 
projects have not been successful anywhere, 
with the exception of North America, as yet. 
It is interesting that Ukraine, hand in hand with 
Poland, has moved to the forefront of shale gas 
extraction. The success of unconventional gas 
extraction projects in Ukraine will be affected 
to a great extent by the development of anal-
ogous projects in Poland, which is four or five 
years ahead of Ukraine. This in particular con-
cerns the Oleska field, which is part of the basin 
which is rich in natural gas and which stretch-
es out through Ukraine and Poland. Chevron’s 
success in Poland will stimulate the develop-
ment of the Ukrainian project. And vice versa 
– a failure of the Polish project will be reflected 
in Ukraine. The development of unconventional 
gas extraction in Ukraine will also affect the sit-
uation in Poland to some extent. The fact that 
ExxonMobil and Canada’s Talisman Energy have 
withdrawn from projects in Poland has adverse-
ly affected the prospects for shale gas projects 
in Europe, and especially in Poland and Ukraine. 
Over the past few months, Ukraine has made 
its first steps towards developing an unconven-
tional gas extraction project. These steps can 
be described as firm and quite effective, but 
not devoid of errors, since they have provoked 
a domestic dispute. It may be expected that 
the unconventional gas issue will give rise to 
tension on the Ukrainian political scene more 
than once, especially when the next elections 
are scheduled. Unconventional gas projects, 
which are or will be implemented under pro-
duction separation agreements, will be a regu-
lar subject of haggling and political turbulence. 
Each subsequent government will wish to verify 
these projects to gain benefits for themselves17. 
Time will also show to what extent the pro-
duction separation agreements concerning 
unconventional gas extraction – especially in 
the Yuzivska field – are successful. It is worth 
remembering the ‘contract of the century’ 
singed in 1994 in Azerbaijan. The production 
separation agreements concerning the Azeri- 
-Chirag-Guneshli fields signed with the inter-
national consortium led by BP were seen as 
17 The mistake the government and foreign investors are 
making is that the production separation agreements 
have not been ratified by parliament. Although this is 
not required, the parliamentary procedure would bol-
ster their legal validity. 
It can may be expected that the uncon-
ventional gas issue will give rise to ten-
sion on the in Ukrainian political scene 
politics more than once, especially when 
the next elections are scheduled. 
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extremely unbeneficial for Baku. However, it 
became clear fifteen years later that Azerbai-
jan had benefited from this in strategic terms 
(from the economic, political and social point 
of view). Nevertheless, the presence of Western 
corporations has not made the regime in Baku 
more European. However, in contrast to Kyiv’s 
efforts to become integrated with the EU, Azer-
baijan has in no way wished for this. Will the 
post-Soviet kleptocracy transform into a more 
elegant form of modern Western plutocracy 
if the unconventional gas projects succeed in 
Ukraine? The answer will be known in twenty 
years’ time. 
Mykhailo Gonchar
Director of Energy Programmes, NOMOS Cen-
tre (Ukraine)
The production separation agreement 
with Shell (the Yuzivska field)
The first – and so far the only – production 
separation agreement was signed with Shell 
in Davos on 24 January 2013. This contract cov-
ers all the sedimentary deposits (gaseous and 
rare hydrocarbons) located within the plot’s pe-
rimeter and limited by a depth of up to 10,000 
metres below the surface or by the geological 
foundation (whichever of the levels is reached 
first). Pursuant to this document, in the first 
stage, Shell assumed the obligation to invest 
US$410 million, which will be spent on a ge-
ological survey and exploration work. The first 
effects of this work are expected to be known 
before 2015. Confirmed reserves will give a real 
picture for the prospects of industrial produc-
tion at this field. According to the optimistic 
scenario18, the output after 2020 will reach 
20 billion m3 annually, and according to the 
pessimistic scenario, it will be 10 billion m3. This 
18 See the statement made by the Minister of the Energy 
and Coal Industry of Ukraine, Eduard Stavytsky in Jan-
uary this year; http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/pub-
lish/article?art_id=246007630&cat_id=244276429
production level will be possible to achieve on 
condition that the total level of investments is 
US$10 billion as a minimum upon the launch of 
production on an industrial scale. It is estimat-
ed that the investor will have to spend US$10 
billion on work in the initial stage. The state’s 
share in the distribution of gas production may 
range between 31% and 60%, depending on 
the R factor level, which is inversely proportion-
al to the output value19. This is a key provision, 
since there are numerous speculations about 
the asymmetry, unbeneficial for Ukraine, in the 
production separation agreement. As shown 
above, the state’s minimum share in the in-
comes was set at 16.5% in the tender. However, 
pursuant to the agreement, this share will be at 
least twice as high. This provision was included 
with the consent of both parties, so that the 
increased share of the state in the profitable 
part of hydrocarbon production could compen-
sate for all taxes unpaid by each of the investor 
firms, including the operator.
19 The agreement on the separation of the production of 
hydrocarbons to be extracted within the confines of the 
Yuzivska plot, p. 85.
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SPK-GeoService and the interests 
of ‘the family’ 
SPK-GeoService, a firm established by three 
well-known geologists, has found itself in the 
centre of public interest. Its participation in the 
project surprised expert circles and the media, 
and outraged the public. In turn, the political 
opposition started to suspect that this is a bo-
gus firm, whose real beneficiaries are oligarchs, 
and primarily ‘the family’, who would like 
to take over part of the future incomes from 
shale gas extraction20. However, it seems that 
20 M. Gonchar, Unconventional Gas Resources in Ukraine, 
Review for UGOS, 2012. 
the role of this firm has been definitely over-
rated. 10% is too little to satisfy the appetites 
of the ruling class. It appears more likely that 
the potential corruption scheme aimed at tak-
ing care of the interests of ‘the family’ could be 
linked to the future privatisation of the state-
owned corporation Nadra Ukrayny. Although 
this privatisation is not on the agenda now, it 
cannot be ruled out that this is just a matter 
of time. However, this will take place no earli-
er than in 2018–2019, when it is clear whether 
these fields contain commercial reserves of gas. 
It can be assumed now that the private interest 
of the Ukrainian government has played the 
role of initiator for the unconventional gas ex-
traction projects.
The Oleska and the Yuzivska fields Forecast for Ukrainian gas production 
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